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POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY IN THE BLACK
AFRICAN CONTEXT

John A. Wiseman
University of Newcastle-upon-Tyne
In my book Political Leaders in Black Africa I present shon
biographical essays on several hundred politicians of the postindependence period. 1 My brief was to write biographies of a
multiplicity of individual politicians rather than, as is more
commonly the case in political biography, to write about a single
political actor. Also, the black African context creates a dissimilarity with most political biographies, because in most biographies the subjects are .predominantly European or American,
though there are occasional exceptions like Mao Zedong or
Mohandas K. Gandhi. In spite of these differences the writing of
political biography raises common questions and problems to
which a comparative approach may be applied.
Political biography implies a recognition of the fact that
individual political leaders are important and cannot be seen as
mere corks bobbing about on an uncontrollable sea of impersonal
social and economic forces. Individuals make decisions from a
range of options which allow for different outcomes. While the
choice of decision is necessarily constrained by factors beyond the
individual, it is not predetermined. These decisions have consequences, and if the individual making them is powerful and
influential, these consequences will have an impact on the political process. Thus an adequate understanding of politics involves
an appreciation of the role played by individual political actors,
especially those we could categorize as political leaders.
However, there is an inherent danger in this approach,
because it could lead us back to a "great man" theory of political
development in which everything is explained as the outcome of
the actions, ideas and whims of an individual leader, who is
praised or blamed for all that happens. Indeed, powerful political
leaders may themselves encourage this approach through the
development of massive personality cults (e.g. Adolph Hitler,
Josef Stalin, Kim Il Sung, Kwame Nkrumah, etc.). Political
biographers have to be acutely sensitive to the circumstances in
which the individual under study is active politically. Biographers must consider a range of social, economic and historical
circumstances. Since politics is the art of the possible, it is these
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factors that determine what it is possible for actors to do. Biographers cannot make realistic assessments of an individual outside
this context.
Good political biography involves an understanding of the
two-way relationship between ~ndivid~al political leaders and
their political environments. This may mvolve an assessment of
how individual leaders misjudge the opponunities and constraints
which face them; and that assessment requires biographers to
consider political skills, which are very difficult indeed to specify.
During the development of political science over the last
fifty years , political biography has not figured especially prominently.2 An emphasis on ~n_dividualshas appeared antithetical to
the various models of polmcal systems that were developed and
less than amenable to the mass statistical techniques that were
favored in the profession. Some political scientists, of course, did
write political biography, but when they did so, they were seen as
political historians. I regard this distinction as anificial , although
it might be the case that the pursuit of biographical studies outside
"political science" has worked to the benefit of everyone, in that
biographers have avoided the worst excesses of faddish "scientific" methodologies. Indeed I would regard it as retrograde if
political biographers were now to feel the need to develop a
biographical paradigm. A comparative study of different methodologies is an entirely different matter and should be welcomed .
BIOGRAPHY IN THE AFRICAN CONTEXT
In the literature on African politics, political biography has never
had a prominent role, but its use has nonetheless fluctuated. In the
1960s, the first post-independence decade, there were a few
political biographies of major nationalist leaders (Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Jomo Kenyatta, etc .). A majority
of these were written by journalists or by people who had worked
with the leaders themselves, rather than by academics . This
should not be taken as criticism, as I have a high regard for good
quality journalism.
In the 1970s, biography tended to dry up because of
dependency theory, according to which the workings of African
political systems were to be explained in the context of internatio~al capitalism . This approach tended to relegate indigenous
African factors to a position of secondary importance, epiphenomena of a globally-determined structure. It would be difficult
to imagine a theoretical system less conducive to the focus on the
individual.
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In the 1980s, recognition of indigenous African factors as
causal elements in structuring African political systems once
again increased. This was due in part to a recognition of the
importance of political leadership, heralded in 1982 by the publication of Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg's hugely
influential Personal Rule in Black Africa. 3 Their argument was
that in Africa weak institutionalization tended to produce a
situation in which individual leaders, of widely varying types,
exercized a degree of political influence which would be more
difficult to obtain in established systems. Personal rule was
portrayed as an alternative to constitutional rule, and a renewed
emphasis was placed on partrimonialism and clientelism, and on
the essentially personal character of rulership . Although some
writers had already commented on the importance of leaders in
particular African states, 4 this book was largely responsible for
placing the individual at the forefront of attempts to explain
African politics at a general and comparative level. Much of the
writing on African politics since 1982 has attempted to develop,
utilize and occasionally refute the centrality of personal rule. In
this context Africanist political biography has received a boost
from a methodological shift in political science.
Yet Africanist political biography remains inherently
problematical. Some of the problems of are common to political
biography in general, but other problems may be unique or, at
least, especially acute in the African context.
Black Africa lacks a biographical tradition in literature,
although it does have a very strong oral tradition reflected in praise
songs and stories concerning political leaders of the past. In some
cases contemporary leaders have used this rradition by hiring
praise singers to recount their glories publicly, but in the circumstances of such commercial transactions objectivity necessarily
has a low priority. While this oral source is not to be neglected,
and indeed often contains much instructive material, it is not
directly comparable with other biographical traditions. Scholars
working on political biography elsewhere are likely to have
available from the start a whole series of biographies and autobiographies relevant to their work. Even if the individual with
whom they are dealing has not been subjected to biographical
portrayal, it is very likely that many colleagues , friends and
opponents have had their activities recorded, and so useful material and ideas can be gleaned from such sources . As an example
of the problems facing Africanists because of a lack of a biographical tradition, I would mention a personal experience. I was
approached recently by a publisher who wanted me to write a
biography of the president of a small West African state on which
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I have done a considerable amount of research. One of the reasons
why I turned down this off er was that there exists not a single
biography or autobiography of any politician in this state from any
stage of its history.
For the Africanist biographer even the most basic biographical information, such as the year of birth of an individual,
is often unobtainable. All of Africa's post-independence political
leaders were born in the colonial period. It is likely, especially if
they were born and raised in the rural areas, that there simply are
no written records of their early life. Even if records were kept,
the deterioration of the archival resources in most African states,
due both to the climate and to poverty (and sometimes to willful
neglect) makes information retrieval a very chancy business. As
an extreme case I would cite President Ali Soilih of the Republic
of the Comoros, who ordered all government records and archives
burnt in 1977.
The element of personal rule in many African political
systems, especially when combined with a "closed" authoritarian
system, poses problems for biographical works which do not
focus on the dominant individual leader. This is most evidently
the case for a work comprising multiple biographies, such as my
own book. In a number of states, such as Gabon, Malawi, Cote
d'Ivoire and Zaire, the political system has been overwhelmingly
dominated by an individual leader (Albert Bongo, Hastings Banda,
Felix Houphouet-Boigny and Joseph Mobutu, respectively). Since
these leaders came to power (Banda and Houphouet-Boigny at
independence, Bongo and Mobutu after independence), they have
eclipsed all other political leaders to such an extent that it is
difficult to identify important politicians below the top level of
government.
Furthermore, the occupations of even senior government
officials are often transitory and entirely at the discretion of the
ruler. The leaders mentioned above, and many others as well,
have adopted a deliberate policy of blocking the emergence into
politics of other individuals, because they might become rivals.
The problems that this creates for political succession are obvious,
and a key question in many African states is, What happens when
President X dies? However, in some African states the problem
is reversed. From 1960 to 1972 Benin (formerly Dahomey) had
ten different heads of state, some of whom lasted for just a few
weeks before being removed in a cycle of coups. It is difficult to
make any sensible assessment of a leader who is in power for such
a short period of time.
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The question of assessment is a perennial one for political
biographers. This is partly due to the individual-environment
relationship discussed above: How much of the success or failure
of a political leader can be attributed to environmental factors?
This involves counterf actual judgements: how different would
circumstances have been if a particular leader had not been in
power at a particular time? Also political scientists tend to study
living political leaders, or those only recently deceased. This has
some advantages, such as the possibility of interviewing the
individual in question or his close associates, but it also has
disadvantages, in that it is difficult to decide if the subject is really
of long-term significance or is merely of ephemeral interest.
These issues pose particular problems in the black African context, because the post-independence period is relatively short in
historical terms, amounting to three decades at most in the
majority of cases.
In some modem nations there has been only one leader so
far, and this obviously precludes comparison other than across
national boundaries. Such cases also make it difficult to judge the
durability of the system which the leader has established. In
Guinea, for example, the political and institutional system established by Sekou Toure between 1958 and 1984 survived for only
a few days after his demise. By contrast the system which Seretse
Khama established in Botswana survives intact more than a
decade after his death in 1980. Perhaps the most difficult task for
African political leaders is to make themselves dispensable.
I hope that the work I have been doing on multiple
biographies of African politicians will produce results which have
a wider interest than the assessment of the particular individuals
surveyed. One possibility is that these short biographies might
form part of a database for general comparative use, covering
information on education, ethnicity, generational cohort, regional
factors, religion, parental background, former occupation, etc.
One very firm conclusion that has emerged so far is that it
is extremely hazardous and insecure being a political leader in
Africa. The number of African political leaders who have died as
a result of violence in politics is extremely high, and there are
many who have spent long periods in prison or exile. Even more
disturbing is the random way that such reversals of fortune occur.
Biographies of politicians in the black African context may be
short and ill-documented by European and American standards,
yet they are anything but dull.
I append five biographies of black African politicians as
examples:
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DA WDA KAIRABA JA WARA: THE GAMBIA
Jawara has been the dominant figure in Gambian politics since
independence, and he has been instrumental in preserving a
democratic and largely stable political system.
Born in Barajally in 1924, he was known as David before
converting to Islam. The son of a Mandinka farmer, he was
educated locally and in Ghana before going to the University of
Glasgow, Scotland, where he graduated in veterinary medicine in
1953. He was the first person from the up-river rural areas of The
Gambia to hold a university degree. Returning home, he worked
as a veterinary officer in the colonial administration. In 1959 he
was one of the founders of the Protectorate People's Party (PPP,
later the People's Progressive Pany), which was formed to defend
the interests of rural people, who had hitheno been neglected.
With the extension of the franchise to the whole of the
population the PPP won the 1962 election, and Jawara became
prime minister in the pre-independence government. He retained
this position after independence in 1965, and was knighted by the
British in 1966. Shonly after independence he held a referendum
on a proposal to change the country to a republic, but it was
narrowly defeated. A second referendum on the subject was held
in 1970, and this timeitreceivedmajority support. Thismeantthat
Jawara became president of the new republic, and the British
monarch ceased to be the formal head of state.
The Gambia has retained a multi-party liberal-democratic
political system throughout the post-independence period, but in
spite of the existence of lively opposition parties, the PPP under
Jawara's leadership has won a majority of seats in each election.
The president has exhibited a strong personal commitment to
democracy and has strongly resisted any suggestion that The
Gambia should become a one-party state.
Although his initial success was based on the suppon of
up-river rural people, once in power he worked to develop a truly
national base for the PPP. This led to accusations that he was
neglecting the interests of his own Mandinka ethnic group, the
largest in the population, but he refused to be drawn into policies
of ethnic favoritism. He has shown enormous skill in balancing
the interests of the various ethnic, regional and religious groups
within the country.
In July 1981, the political tranquillity of The Gambia was
temporarily shattered by an attempted coup mounted by members
of the paramilitary section of the police and discontented urban
youths. Jawara was in Britain attending a royal wedding when the
coup took place, but several members of his family were taken
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hostage by the rebels. To help put down the revolt, the president
arranged for assistance from the army of neighboring Senegal
under a mutual defense pact. In the event the rebels were defeated
and the hostages released, but many people died in the fighting. In
the ensuing trials due process of law was strictly followed, and
judges were brought in from other Commonwealth countries to
help in hearing the cases. The attempted coup appears to have
been an isolated and atypical incident, and by the following year
general elections were held in the usual manner. During the
elections Jawara narrowly escaped death in a helicopter crash
which killed some of his travelling companions.
One outcome of Jawara's strategy in reversing the attempted coup of 1981 was the creation of a new confederal
structure linking The Gambia and Senegal. This proved difficult
to implement, because of Gambian fears of domination by the
larger and more powerful Senegalese state. After several years of
very slow progress, marked by disagreement and tension, the
confederation finally broke down in 1989.
Although The Gambia is one of Africa's smallest and
poorest states Jawara's record over the long period he has been in
power is impressive. An intelligent, skillful and modest man, he
will be a hard act to follow.
KW AME FRANCIS NWIA KOFIE NKRUMAH: GHANA
Nkrumah was the leading figure in the nationalist movement in
Anglophone Africa, and arguably in the whole of black Africa . He
was also the principal leader in the pan-Africanist movement, and
the first president of Ghana. Although he was overthrown by a
coup in 1966 and died in exile in 1972, his memory is still a
powerful influence in many parts of Africa today.
Born the son of a goldsmith in Nkroful in southwestern
Ghana in 1909, Nkrumah belonged to the Nzima ethnic group.
Educated locally, he moved to the USA for higher learning. There
he received bachelor's and higher degrees in sociology, theology
and education, and was appointed to an academic post at Lincoln
University, Pennsylvania. He was also elected president of the
African Students Organization of the USA and Canada. During
this time he was much influenced by the writings of Karl Marx ,
Gandhi and particularly Marcus Garvey, who was the major
source for his pan-African beliefs. In 1945 he moved to England
to study law, although he probably spent more time working for
a variety of pan-Africanist organizations and editing the New
African Magazine.
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In 1947 he returned to Ghana to become general secretary
of the recently formed United Gold Coast Convention, a post to
which he brought remarkable vigor. In 1948 he was arrested along
with other UGCC leaders following serious rioting. After their
release, major policy splits developed within the UGCC leadership, with Nkrumah favoring a much more radical, activist approach to pressing for the end of colonial rule. In 1949 he broke
away to form his own Convention People's Party (CPP), which
rapidly developed into the major nationalist party in Ghana. It
formed close links with trade unions and the urban working
classes . In the 1951 elections the CPP was the majority party, and
Nkrumah became leader of government business, and then in
1952 prime minister. Following repeated election victories he
retained this position at independence in 1957, and with the
creation of the republic in 1960 he became president.
After independence there were two distinct aspects to
Nkrumah's politics: the international and the domestic . On the
international front he acted to inspire those Africans still under
colonial rule. He worked ceaselessly but ultimately unsuccessfully to bring about a political union amongst the newly emerging
states of black Africa, spending large amounts of Ghanaian
money on this project. The creation of the Organization of African
Unity in 1963, which represented a bare minimum of cooperation,
was a disappointment for him, but he regarded it as a starting point
for a more thoroughgoing union in the future. On the world stage
he was the most significant African leader of his generation.
In Ghana itself Nkrumah's period in office was marked by
economic incompetence and a frightening build-up of political
repression and corruption. As early as 1958 he introduced a
preventive detention act which permitted arrest without charge
and imprisonment without trial. Many opposition leaders were
victims of this act. Later he moved against all potential centers of
opposition, including the trade unions, the judiciary, the universities and the traditional leaders. A rigid state censorship was
introduced which resulted in the destruction of all parts of the
mass media which were not totally supportive of himself. In 1964
all opposition parties were banned, and he proclaimed himself
"president for life." Throughout this period a massive personality
cult was erected around Nkrumah as he acquired titles such as
"star of Ghana," "the redeemer" and "initiator of the African
personality." Increasingly surrounded by sycophants, he became
cut off from reality as the country plunged into economic crisis.
Doubting the loyalty of the army he built up a separate military
force , the President's Own Guard Regiment, answerable only to
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himself and better equipped and paid than the regular armed
forces.
In February 1966, when Nkrumah was out of the country,
the army staged a coup which met virtually no resistance and was
popularly welcomed. He went into exile in Guinea where he was
granted the honorary title of co-president by his friend and fellow
pan-Africanist Sekou Toure . While in exile he wrote a number of
books, but his health began to fail, and in 1972 he died of cancer
in a Rumanian hospital.
K wame Nkrumah was inspirational in asserting black
African dignity, but for Ghana his period of rule was an unqualified disaster.
SERETSE KHAMA: BOTSWANA
Khama was a politician of immense skill and integrity, and he was
the founding father of modern Botswana (previously the Bechuanaland Protectorate).
Born in 1921, Khama was a grandson ofKhama the Great
and the undisputed heir to the powerful B amangwato chieftaincy.
When his father died in 1925 Seretse was only four years old; his
uncle Tshekedi was made regent until Seretse came of age and
completed his education. While reading law at the Inns of Court
in London, Seretse married a white woman, Ruth Williams, in
1949. Although his marriage was accepted by the Bamangwato,
the British government, under pressure from the newly elected
nationalists in South Africa, banned Seretse and his wife from his
homeland and stripped him of his hereditary rights to the chieftaincy. Although this action devastated Seretse at the time, it
played an important part in his later political success. He maintained his enormous traditional prestige in the country, where his
people continued to regard him as their rightful leader, but he was
never encumbered with the very considerable but essentially
mundane day-to-day duties which went with the chieftaincy.
Khama emerged as a modern, well-educated leader who gained
widespread support, not merely local tribal loyalty. The Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP), which he was instrumental in founding
in 1962, won sweeping victories in every subsequent election and
has proved itself a truly national party. Khama was a traditional
leader who used his prestige to transfer the traditional powers of
chiefs to the new democratically elected central government. And
he was also the leading Bamangwato who reduced inter-tribal
animosities and encouraged his people to leave tribal loyalty
behind and to identify with the new national state .
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Seretse Khama was president of Botswana from independence in 1966 until his death in 1980. Under his leadership this
period was one of quite remarkable progress. Economically the
country was one of Africa's success stories: real national per
capita income tripled as both agriculture and mineral extraction
boomed. A unified, efficient and non-corrupt state srructure was
created to replace the loose aggregation of tribes, held together by
a tenuous and half-hearted colonial administration. During his
tenure the political system continued to be both stable and democratic with a full range of civil liberties and regular free and fair
elections. Seretse' s personal abhorrence of racial discrimination
and apartheid led him to pursue a successful policy of nonracialism within the country, and relations there between black
and white were marked by an absence of tension.
Khama also emerged as an international statesman of
great repute and as a force for moderation among the frontline
states. He played an important role in solving the Rhodesia/
Zimbabwe crisis. His commitment to human rights did not extend
merely to attacks on white racism. He was one of the few African
leaders who openly criticized theruleofldi Amin in Uganda while
Amin was still in power. As a protest against the atrocities of the
Amin regime, Khama refused to attend the Organization of
African Unity summit when it was held in Kampala. Khama was
always a skillful politician, never a tyrant, and he was a natural
conciliator. The extent of his success is all the greater when seen
in the context of Botswana's distinctly unfavorable locationland-locked and surrounded by strife-torn southern Africa.
Khama's greatest legacy to Botswana was to have made
himself dispensable and to have built up a system that could
survive his departure. Since his death from cancer in July 1980
Botswana has remained a democratic and prosperous state, running on the lines he laid down.
AHMED (MATHIEU) KEREKOU: BE:t\TIN
Since seizing power in a coup in 1972 Kerekou proved to be much
the most durable of Benin's post-independence heads of state,
most of whom lasted only a short time in office. In March 1991
he was defeated in the first competitive presidential election to
take place in Benin for several decades.
Born into the Somba ethnic group in 1933, Kerekou
completed his military training in France, transferring from the
French to the Dahomean army in 1961. From 1961 to 1962 he
served as an aide to President Maga, and his progress through the
army command structure was helped by the fact that he was the
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cousin of Colonel Kouandete, who acted as his patron. Kerekou
assisted his cousin in staging a coup in 1967, and he was made
president of the revolutionary military committee. After the
return to civilian rule in Dahomey in 1968, Kerekou went to
France for further military training and was not involved in his
cousin's second coup of 1969. In 1970 he was appointed deputy
chief of staff of the army.
In October 1972 Kerekou led his own coup, overthrowing
the government of Ahomadegbe. He then purged the army of
officers senior to himself and became army chief of staff as well
as head of state. Although Kerekou had previously exhibited little
interest in political ideologies, he suddenly announced in 1974
that the country had been transformed into a Marxist-Leninist
state. But it was not until the following year that the Benin
People's Revolutionary Party (PRPB) could be fully established
as the only legal party; Kerekou was its leader. In 1975 he changed
the name of the state from Dahomey to Benin, an ancient African
kingdom. His declaration of Marxism-Leninism was accompanied by large-scale nationalization of the economy and a massive
expansion of the bureaucracy. At one stage bureaucratic salaries
were costing 92 per cent of the state budget, though they were paid
in an erratic fashion.
In 1977 Benin adopted a new constitution, creating a
revolutionary national assembly. In 1979 there were elections, for
which only PRPB members were enfranchised. In 1980 this body
formally elected Kerekou as president. In theory Benin then had
a civilian government, although military influence remained
strong, and it was not until 1987 that Kerekou officially resigned
from the army.
In 1980 Kerekou converted to Islam while on a state visit
to Libya, changing his first name from Mathieu to Ahmed. For a
time Benin enjoyed very cordial relations with Libya as Kerekou
sought to project a "radical" international image. By the mid1980s, however, he was seeking closer ties with western countries
in order to gain financial aid for his bankrupt economy. In 1985
he announced to the PRPB congress that he had approached the
International Monetary Fund for assistance, and since then the
Marxist rhetoric of the regime has been considerably toned down
and eventually abandoned .
Towards the end of the 1980s domestic pressure on the
regime grew, and in February 1990 Kerekou agreed to allow for
the re-introduction of a multi-party system. In the interim period
he retained the presidency but agreed to relinquish his defense
portfolio. In March 1991 he was convincingly defeated in the
presidential election. However, although he was eventually
114

ousted, he has to be judged a remarkable survivor. Prior to his
nearly two decades in power the country had ten changes of ruler,
mostly violent, in twelve years. Through a mixture of political
skill and oppressive force he managed to engineer a precarious
stability for his regime.
JULIUS KAMBARAGE NYERERE: TANZANIA
Nyerere has been one of Africa's most highly regarded statesmen
in the post-independence period. He was head of state until
retiring from the presidency in 1985.
Born in 1922 in Butiama into one of the smallest ethnic
groups in the country, the Zanaki, he trained as a teacher in
Uganda and taught for several years in Tabora. From 1949 to 1952
he was a student at the University of Edinburgh where he became
his country's first graduate. He returned home to teach and begin
his political career. In 1954 he founded the Tanganyika African
National Union (TANU), which was to become the ruling party,
and became its president. In the 1958 and 1960 elections T ANU
won overwhelming majorities and became one of the very few
nationalist parties to experience no serious opposition in the late
colonial phase. Nyerere became chief minister in the pre-independence government and in December 1961 the country's first
post-independence prime minister. Shortly afterwards he resigned the premiership for a few months to devote himself to
reorganizing the party, and with the creation of a republic in 1962,
when the British monarch ceased to be the formal head of state, he
became the country's first president.
There is linle doubt that under Nyerere's leadership
Tanzania has been amongst the more politically stable states in
Africa, although there is considerable debate as to how far this is
a result of leadership or how far it is due to an absence of
significant ethnic and regional cleavages of the sort which have
afflicted other African states. It is probably accurate to say that
Tanzania has faced less intractable political difficulties than most
states in black Africa. Apart from an army mutiny in 1964, which
was not a coup and was easily dealt with by British forces , and a
genuine but unsuccessful coup attempt in 1983, the regime has not
been subjected to any very serious challenges .
In 1964 Nyerere negotiated the union of mainland Tanganyika and the offshore island of Zanzibar to form a single state,
although for many years the union was stronger on paper than in
fact and still contains unresolved tensions. Before the 1965
elections he altered the political system in Tanzania (excluding
Zanzibar) to a single-party state, but with some allowance for
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electoral competition between candidates within T ANU. In 1977
a new pany, Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM-Pany of the Revolution) was formed with the merger of T ANU and the Zanzibari
Afro-Shirazi Pany (ASP). Nyerere was continuously leader of
T ANU and CCM until he retired from the leadership of the latter
in 1990. In 1967 the Arusha Declaration established a leadership
code for pany and government elites in an attempt to prevent
single-pany dominance leading to abuse of office, but it is
generally agreed that this has been at best only panially successful. Although he was for many years the most aniculate defender
of the single-pany state in Africa, by the late 1980s Nyerere was
becoming increasingly critical of this form of government and
was arguing that lack of opposition had produced complacency
and neglect of the public interest in Tanzania. Some of his critics
put it more strongly and claimed that the dominance ofTANU and
CCM had created a new elite which had used its undisputed
control to further its own interests.
In terms of economic development the period of Nyerere's
presidency produced extremely disappointing results. Following
the adoption of"African socialism" the most significant sectors of
the economy were nationalized and placed under the control of the
state and the party, but performance standards have been very
poor. In the 1970s a major attempt was made to restructure
agricultural production with the creation of "ujamaa" (communal) villages. At first this was done on a voluntary basis, but when
the peasants failed to respond, compulsion, often involving high
levels of coercion, was used. The whole scheme is now recognized as a failure . By the late 1980s Tanzania was moving slowly
toward a more liberal form of economic policy .
In the international arena Nyerere has rightly been regarded as one of Africa's leading statesmen. Although Tanzania
has received aid from a variety of sources, especially the USA, it
has managed to follow a policy of genuine non-alignment. Nyerere
has been amongst the leading critics of apartheid in South Africa
but has also attacked abuses of human rights in black-ruled states,
and in 1979 the Tanzanian army overthrew the despotic rule of Idi
Amin in neighboring Uganda. Nyerere has also been a leading
supporter of economic cooperation between the black-ruled states
of the Southern African region. He has also emerged as the
leading intellectual amongst Africa's political leaders , and his
numerous writings on "African socialism" have been extremely
influential, although by the 1990s they were viewed with increasing criticism. His literary achievements include the translation of
Shakespeare's plays into Swahili.
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In 1985 Nyerere retired from the presidency, although he
continued to lead the ruling pany until 1990. Although the fruits
of his period in power were not entirely positive, nobody can
doubt his integrity, personal humility and dedication to improving
the lot of the Tanzanian people who continued to respect "Mwalimu" (Swahili for "teacher") in spite of the problems that Tanzania has continued to experience.
NOTES
1 Aldershot, England: Edward Elgar, 1991. The five sample
biographies at the conclusion of this anicle are drawn from the text
of this book.
2 Political biography, however, is perhaps becoming more important in political science. Professor OlofRuin of the University of
Stockholm has outlined this issue in the terms of reference for the
Workshop on "PoliticalBiography"fortheEuropean
Consortium
for Political Research Joint Sessions, held at Bochum, Germany,
April 2-7, 1990. He commented that an "interest in political
biography seems to be rising in political science" and that this
"grov.ring interest is in turn correlated with growing interest
generally in the problems of political leadership." However his
remark that in "the ideological climate of today single individuals
tend to be in focus" is problematic for me, because it seems to
suggest a depersonalized "guiding hand."
3
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982.
4
See, for example, my "Botswana: The Achievement of Seretse
Khama," The Round Table, no. 280 (October 1980), pp. 409-14.
This was not written within a framework that stressed personal
rule, nor did it stress clientelism.
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